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Regulation by means of price in order to remove excess demand is generally 
perceived as being unfair. This paper empirically tests different principles of 
regulation including lotteries, rationing, a moral rule and compensation.  
We start from the postulate that the perception of the fairness of TGV and car park is 
important for a successful implementation. This perception is analysed through the 
results of an attitudinal survey held in Lyons area in 2003 (N≈400). We confirm that 
peak-period pricing as a means of limiting demand is overwhelmingly rejected. 
Administrative allocation and lotteries are also rejected. The reference transaction can 
also lead to rejection of waiting line. Price compensation is overwhelmingly 
considered to be fair and the right to this is demanded both from public or private 
sector monopoly: it is possible therefore to reinstate pricing in the form of 
compensation.  
Those surveyed express rather definite preferences for some principles of regulation 
(moral rule, compensation) to the detriment of pricing or even the administrative or 
traditional regulation (queuing). Ways of unfreezing the situation are identified, who 
could be exploited in order to form coalitions likely to support this kind of policy. 
Finally, certain dimensions of the equity are revealed through the analysis of the 
survey. 
 
 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the seminal work of Pareto (1927), Pigou (1920, 1947) and Samuelson (1947), 
standard economic theory has established that regulation by means of price is an 
efficient means of allocating a scarce resource. As Glazer and Lave (1996) and 
Brueckner (2002) have shown, this applies in all but very rare circumstances.  
The issue of regulating access to scarce resources by prices is crucial for public goods 
which are subjected to congestion, for example in the transport sector where pricing is 
the accepted means of regulating congestion (Dupuit (1849), Pigou (1920), Vickrey 
(1963)). 
This use of prices to eliminate excess demand can however be perceived as unfair 
when the exchange fails to take account of the reference transaction defined by 
Kahneman, Knestsch, and Thaler (KKT, 1986). Slightly provocatively, Frey and 
Pommerehne (1993), and Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann (2002), hold that 
economists lay too much emphasis on the role of pricing as a means of regulation and 
argue that ethical considerations should be taken into account when attempting to gain 
acceptance for policies involving regulation by prices. Resistance to the introduction 
of new pricing measures is also observed in the transport sector (Raux and Souche, 
2004).  
This resistance has prompted us to test whether, in a context of scarce resources, 
regulation by prices is actually rejected by the population, and if so, to what extent. 
We shall attempt to test empirically different principles of regulation including 
lotteries, rationing, a moral rule and compensation in order to see if these receive 
more support than regulation by prices.  
Our results partially invalidate the above findings from the literature. They confirm 
the role of the reference transaction and also show that other regulation principles may 
be considered to be less unfair, or even fairer, than pricing on its own. 
Based on a survey of the empirical and theoretical literature we have formulated 
questions which we shall go on to test empirically. We shall then present the 
methodology used in the study which relates to situations in which the supply of rail 
transport and parking supply is scarce. Last, we shall set out our principal findings 
showing whether or not they validate our hypotheses.  
 
2.   LITERATURE SURVEY AND TESTED HYPOTHESES  
 
In a seminal paper on this topic, Kahneman, Knestsch, and Thaler (KKT, 1986) 
established, with empirical backing, the existence of a dual entitlement by which 
“transactors” have a right over the terms of the reference transaction while the firm 
also has a right over the reference profits. 
Slightly provocatively, Frey and Pommerehne (FP, 1993) asked the following 
question: how can the regulation of excess demand by prices be considered to be 
unfair when economists recommend it as a principle? In the face of a situation where 
water is scarce, these authors identified and tested several procedures for allocating 
resources each of which implemented a different principle of justice. For the rationing 
of excess demand they found that a classical “first come, first served” procedure or an 
administrative procedure are considered fairer than a pricing procedure which consists 
of paying more for resources which have become scarce. On this basis, they conclude 
that economists should include moral or ethical aspects in their analysis if they wish 
to increase their ability to guide policy. In connection with a public good, Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee (1996) have also shown that when it is necessary to decide on the siting of a public good which is not welcome locally, compensation is insufficient and 
procedures which are perceived as fair should play an essential role.  
Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal (2003) reconsidered the dual entitlement in the reference 
transaction and showed that a price rise, even one which is justified on the grounds of 
costs, can be considered to be less fair when it is the result of a deliberate choice on 
the part of the vendor. Bolton et al. (2003) demonstrated that consumers are sensitive 
to certain reference points (past prices, competitors’ prices, cost of the goods sold) but 
underestimate the effects of inflation: they overestimated the extent to which price 
differences are the result of vendor’s profits and fail to take account of all the latter’s 
costs. 
On the basis of the persisting resistance to wider use of pricing for regulating excess 
demand in the case of transport for example, we firstly wished to test the current 
validity of the foregoing empirical results and secondly to explore further attitudes to 
certain principles of allocation. A number of questions emerged from our survey of 
the theoretical and empirical literature and we shall investigate these empirically. 
The first question relates to the constancy of the rejection, highlighted by the literature 
survey, of the use of prices to allocate scarce resources. Question 1: is the principle of 
allocating scarce resources by prices always rejected? 
Next, we attempted to explore more fully the terms of this rejection by investigating 
different situations in which the principle is implemented.  
The first situation relates to whether the situation of excess demand is foreseeable or 
not. Frey and Pommerehne have shown that people are less averse to pricing in a 
recurring situation where they expect supply to be increased than in an exceptional 
situation where pricing serves to ration demand. For this reason it is important 
systematically to explore variations in attitudes according to whether the regulation 
measures are applied in a recurring or an exceptional situation. 
Second, FP have shown that the regulation of excess demand by pricing, for example 
in the case of water sales at a tourist site, was more strongly rejected in the case of a 
public sector supplier than a private supplier. This question is important when a 
private operator is used to produce a public good, as is the case today with many 
public services and the increasing interest in public-private partnerships, for example 
for water or transport. Question 2: is there a difference between a rejection of the 
principle of regulation by prices depending on whether the supplier belongs to the 
public or the private sector?  
If rejection occurs, we can wonder if other procedures, whose underlying principles 
are easier to explain, would gain better acceptance. FP have shown, for example, that 
the rule of allocation by pricing was perceived as being less fair than a bureaucratic 
procedure in which the administration made allocations on the basis of its own 
judgment; on the other hand this rule was considered to be fairer than a random 
allocation procedure. Taylor et al. (2003) found that in the absence of a system of 
pricing, the lottery is generally more socially acceptable than queues. According to 
the economic theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen, 1971) the bureaucratic procedure is 
considered to be intrinsically particularly unfair. We can therefore assess the degree of 
acceptance of these procedures in order to use them as reference values for calibrating 
the other procedures.  Question 3: are lotteries or administrative allocation better 
accepted than regulation by prices as a means of dealing with excess demand?  
Another factor which may influence the perception of regulation by prices relates to 
the possibility of controlling the use of revenue. This is a principle of economic 
justice set forth by Zajac, in the context of the improper power of a monopoly: “The 
fewer the substitutes for a regulated or monopoly firm’s output, and the more the output is considered an economic right, the more the public expects to exert control 
over the firm. Denial of control is considered unjust.” (Zajac, 1995, p. 127). Question 
4: does the possibility of controlling the use of revenue derived from pricing moderate 
the rejection of regulation by prices?  
With regard to the control of the use of revenue from pricing, given the results of 
Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal (2003) and Bolton et al (2003), it therefore seemed 
interesting to see whether the proposal of additional supply which justifies the price 
increase can modify negative attitudes to regulation by prices. Question 5: can 
providing additional supply which is related to the price increase make this increase 
more acceptable? 
The question of compensation naturally arises. It has been established since the work 
of Hicks (1939) and Kaldor (1939) that in the context of a standard  cost-benefit 
analysis, hypothetical compensation can justify a policy as long as the benefits 
accruing to the winners exceed the losses sustained by the losers. So, in principle, 
effective compensation could counterbalance the rejection of the mechanism of 
allocation by pricing. Lastly, Zajac’s principles of economic justice include the right 
to insurance: “Society is expected to insure individuals against economic loss because 
of economic changes. Failure to insure is considered unfair.” (Zajac, 1995, p. 123). 
However, it seems that this principle of compensation will be rejected because the 
“compensated losers” feel that their votes are beings “bought” (the so-called “bribe 
effect”) in order for the wealthy to be able to benefit from the goods which are 
thereby made available (Frey et al., 1996; Kunreuther and Easterling, 1996). This is 
why Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann (2002) suggest that compensation should 
take a form which is like the purchase of votes as little as possible and attempt to 
reward those who are willing to reduce their consumption of the scare good in the 
same “dimension” as the loss because they make a contribution to improving 
collective wellfare. We have therefore attempted to test explicitly whether a 
compensation mechanism might change the attitude to the mechanism of allocation by 
pricing.  Question 6: does offering compensation which belongs to the same 
“dimension” to those whose demand has been removed improve acceptance of 
regulation by prices?  
A last set of regulation principles represents what can be considered as the classical 
basis of the “reference transaction”. These principles of regulation are widely used in 
all administrative or commercial departments: queueing (or the “first come, first 
served” procedure) is a form of rationing. Barzel (1974) shows that the redistribution 
of a good which is limited in quantity through queueing can be costly and does not 
systematically benefit the poor. Application of a moral rule, for example giving 
priority to persons with reduced mobility, may be based on Rawls’ (1971) two 
principles of equality of chances and difference. Question 7: are the principles which 
form the classical basis of the reference transaction such as queues and a moral rule, 
universally perceived as fair?  
Last, in relation to these principles of allocation, in particular allocation by pricing, it 
is important to establish whether an individual’s economic situation influences his/her 
attitude. Weitzman (1977) has shown that the relative efficiency of pricing or 
rationing for allocating a scarce resource to those who need it most depends on how 
the need in question and incomes are distributed. According to Sah (1987) the poor 
would gain more from rationing and the rich from the market. It is therefore legitimate 
to raise the issue of the relative extent to which attitudes are influenced by income and 
pricing. Question 8: do attitudes vary according to the economic and social situation 
of individuals?  The above questions have been the subject of an empirical investigation using the 
questionnaire and survey which we shall now describe. 
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
 
The survey was conducted in January 2003 and involved face-to-face interviews of a 
sample of 400 persons who were representative
i of the inhabitants of the Lyon 
conurbation (population 1.2 million). The respondents were told four different 
“stories”. Although fictional, these stories described situations which were grounded 
in reality (the Paris-Lyon train or urban parking). Various solutions were proposed for 
solving excess demand and respondents were asked if they found each of the solutions 
essentially fair or essentially unfair
ii. 
Two of the stories involved the allocation of seats in the situations of excess demand 
in the case of the high speed train (TGV) between Paris and Lyon (450 km), which is 
operated by a public sector company, French National Railways (SNCF). As a general 
rule, only passengers with reservations can use this train. The first story describes an 
exceptional situation on a Friday evening: as a result of very bad weather (e.g. a snow 
storm), only one of the three scheduled trains was able to run. The second story 
describes a recurring situation of excess demand, in which rising demand has led to 
intolerable saturation of the service. 
Two other stories dealt with the problem of assigning parking spaces at the car park of 
a firm with premises in the centre of a major city in which it is very difficult to find 
parking in the surrounding area. In one case, the situation was exceptional: 
construction work lasting several months was necessary in the car park which made 
two-thirds of the parking spaces temporarily unavailable. In the other case, the 
situation of excess demand was recurring, the firm was extending its premises by 
building over part of the existing car park. 
Each respondent was only told two stories, one about the TGV and the other about 
parking; in addition, each was told only about the exceptional or the recurring 
situations. Consequently, each of the four stories was told to half the sample
iii. The 
same regulation principles were proposed for each of the four stories.  
The regulation principles we tested are based on the questions listed in the previous 
section. In addition, the scenarios proposed allowed us to test any differences in 
attitude between the public sector operator (SNCF in the case of the train) and the 
private sector operator (a company in the case of parking).  
•  “Peak period pricing with constant supply”: for both the TGV and parking, the 
proposal to cope with excess demand was to pay an additional charge. In the case 
of parking, two alternative proposals were also made with regard to the allocation 
of revenue, in one case it was possible to exert control over its use: in one of the 
alternatives, the revenue was handed over to the firm, and in the other to the firm 
Works Council
iv. 
•  The “unknown administrative rule”: in the case of the TGV this consisted of 
letting the ticket inspectors allocate the available seats, and in the case of parking 
of letting either the firm management or the Works Council allocate the available 
seats. These last two alternatives enabled us also to test the impact of the ability to 
monitor the allocation of demand. 
•  A “lottery”: this consisted of distributing the available seats on a random basis in 
the case of both the TGV and parking. 
•  “Peak period pricing with additional supply”: in the case of the TGV, the operator 
was assumed to have run additional trains which were paid for by the increased price, while in the case of parking, the company rented additional parking spaces 
in a nearby car park. 
•  “Peak period pricing with compensation” in the case of the TGV, in the 
exceptional situation, the proposal was to compensate those who were willing to 
take the train the next day. In the case of recurring excess demand, we suggested 
reducing the price of the ticket below the normal price for those who were willing 
to leave earlier or later. In both situations for company parking, we proposed 
compensating those who were willing not to park in the firm’s car park. 
•  “Queues”: in the case of the TGV, the train was allowed to fill, and in the case of 
parking the car park was allowed to fill.  
•  A “moral rule”: this consisted in both cases of giving priority to persons with 
reduced mobility (pregnant women, elderly and handicapped persons).  
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
The rejection of peak period pricing  
 
Peak period pricing with constant supply was overwhelmingly perceived to be unfair 
in all the situations. For example, for the TGV (10% fair, see v2 in Table 1 in the 
Appendix) and for parking when revenue adds to the firm’s takings both in the 
exceptional situation (7% fair, see Table 2, v11) and the recurring situation (10% 
fair). 
The situations described here all involve excess demand. However, this excess 
demand occurs in circumstances in which it is reasonable to assume that individuals 
consider to be outside their control. This view is supported by the fact that constant 
supply peak period pricing is significantly perceived as a little less unfair in the 
recurring situation (see Table 3, v2, in Appendix): it is as though, when faced by a 
reoccurrence of excess demand, individuals consider that the introduction of peak 
period pricing is less unacceptable because it would have been possible to take 
measures beforehand to avoid the peak. 
 
Exceptional administrative regulation  
 
For both the TGV and parking, exceptional administrative solutions in the form of an 
unknown administrative rule or a lottery are overwhelmingly rejected and considered 
to be barely less unfair than pricing (see Table 1, v4 and v5). This finding concurs 
with those of FP for the lottery, but is quite different for the unknown administrative 
rule as FP found the unknown administrative rule to be better accepted than pricing. 
In the case of parking, we wished to test whether there was a difference in attitudes 
according to the administration in charge of allocating available spaces. To do this, we 
made a distinction between the Management of the Firm (MF) and the Works 
Committee (WC). The decisions taken by the works committee could be influenced 
by members of the workforce who are elected to it by virtue of periodic elections and 
this can help create some hope of compensation which is absent when it is just the 
management of the firm that distributes parking spaces. However, contrary to our 
expectations, our findings indicate that there is no significant difference depending on 
whether the available spaces are allocated at the discretion of the firm or works 
committee (see Table 2, confidence intervals for the medians of the variables v16 and 
v17). To summarize, neither the activities of the inspector on the train, nor those of the 
management of the firm, nor those of the works committee find favour with the 
respondents. This rejection can be explained by the dominant position of the 
administrative authorities which are perceived as holding a monopoly of power. 
Individuals have no, or almost no, margin for manœuvre. As Zajac has explained 
(1995), use of a monopoly of power is perceived as being extremely unfair (see 
above). 
Last, in the case of both TGV and parking, the lottery was widely rejected: we can 
interpret this as expressing strong risk aversion among individuals or as defiance in 
the face of an unusual procedure. 
 
The role of the allocation of revenue from pricing 
 
Do attitudes towards the pricing instrument vary according to how the revenue from it 
is allocated? We have attempted to establish this first of all by considering pricing 
with constant supply where revenue can be allocated in different ways. In the case of 
peak period pricing with constant supply the two alternatives for parking were 
allocation of revenue to the firm and allocation of revenue to the works committee.  
Peak period pricing with constant supply is perceived as being significantly fairer 
when the revenue derived from pricing is handed over to the works committee (28% 
in the case of recurring scarcity, 37% in the case of exceptional scarcity, see Table 2, 
v12) than when this revenue goes into the firm’s coffers (10% in the case of recurring 
scarcity, 7% in the case of exceptional scarcity, v11)
v. 
The first lesson we can draw from these results is that the rejection of peak period 
pricing with constant supply is not intractable. Negative attitudes can be significantly 
moderated by how the revenue is allocated, as shown by the example of parking.  
As our starting point we can interpret these findings with reference to Zajac’s 
principle of economic justice, in connection with the improper power of a monopoly 
(see above). In this case we have two types of monopoly, a public sector monopoly 
consisting of the railway company (SNCF), and a private sector monopoly consisting 
of the company that owns the car park. We can nevertheless see what the problem is 
with the monopoly. We should bear in mind that our results have shown that attitudes 
to peak period pricing are intensely negative whether the supplier belongs to the 
public sector (train) or the private sector (parking). These findings tend to show that 
negative attitudes to peak period pricing are not influenced by the public or private 
nature of the entity offering the good or service, as suggested by Frey and 
Pommerehne (1993), but more by where the revenue goes, as we have seen in the case 
of parking. 
 
The increase in supply and the acceptability of pricing  
We also tested attitudes towards the pricing instrument in a second context in which 
the provision of additional supply, either in the form of extra trains or additional 
parking spaces, incurs additional costs, which may provide a rational justification for 
price increases. It should not be forgotten that in the case of the parking scenario, the 
firm was assumed to have rented the lacking parking spaces in a nearby private car 
park and made those of its employees who used their cars cover the cost of this (v20). 
In the case of the TGV, the railway company (the SNCF) was assumed to have paid 
for extra trains which were funded by charging extra for tickets (v8). Peak period pricing with additional supply is nevertheless perceived as being unfair: 
only 29% of respondents consider it to be fair for the TGV in the case of recurring 
congestion (Table 1, v8), 38% consider it fair for recurring parking congestion and 
51% consider it fair in the case of exceptional parking congestion (Table 2, v20)
vi. 
However, these solutions were not as strongly rejected as peak period pricing with 
constant supply (see above).  
The first lesson is that additional supply which accompanies a price rise can, like the 
way revenue is allocated, reduce opposition among respondents, or even divide those 
for and those against into two approximately equal groups. Our results are to some 
extent consistent with those of FP who noted less price aversion in the recurring 
situation when respondents expect supply to be increased. However, our survey differs 
from that of the above authors as the solutions proposed to respondents explicitly 
mention the additional supply which accompanies the price rise. We have observed 
that this information changes very little in the attitudes of respondents which 
remained generally unfavourable.  
Does this mean it would be advisable to provide additional explanations to gain the 
approval of consumers? This is not what is suggested by the work of Bolton et al. 
(2003) and Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal (2003): however, our results do not prompt 
the same conclusion as, in the case of the TGV, attitudes towards peak period pricing 
with additional supply are less negative than towards peak period pricing with 
constant supply (compare v8 with v2 in Table 1). 
Moreover, for parking, the provision of additional supply (v20), in both exceptional 
and recurring congestion situations gives an unexpected result. Peak period pricing 
with additional supply is considered to be significantly fairer (see Table 4 in the 
Appendix, v20, test U) in the case of exceptional congestion (51%, see Table 2, v20) 
than in the recurring situation (38%). It therefore does not seem to be the recurring 
nature of the situation which makes pricing more acceptable, because in this case 
people  would expect additional supply. It is the very fact of providing additional 
supply which makes pricing more acceptable, and potentially the recurring nature of 
the situation in which this solution is applied could even make it less acceptable.  
 
The right to compensation 
If negative attitudes to the use of peak period pricing to solve problems of excess 
demand were to be confirmed, is there any alternative means of pricing which might 
gain approval?  
Unlike peak period pricing with constant supply, compensation is overwhelmingly 
considered to be fair in the case of the TGV in the recurring situation (80%, see Table 
1, v7), parking in the recurring situation (89%, see Table 2; v19), parking in the 
exceptional situation (93%, v19) and the TGV in the exceptional situation (95%, 
Table 1, v7). 
The right to compensation is therefore strongly reaffirmed. However, our results go 
further than this, as compensation is expected not only from society via a public 
monopoly (the public sector railway company) but also from a private monopoly (the 
private company that owns the car park). The principle of compensation stands out 
among our results as it is the principle which is considered to be the fairest, with the 
principle of a moral rule, in all the situations. 
Another lesson we can draw relates to the additional supply mentioned above: 
providing additional supply in the context of peak period pricing can also be regarded 
as a form of compensation. Our results show that it is perceived as being extremely indirect and hypothetical: support for this type of solution is much lower than support 
for direct compensation as we can see if we compare the pricing solutions with 
additional supply with the solutions with direct compensation (compare V8 and V7 in 
Table 1and V20 and V19 in Table 2). 
It is of course the case that pricing is overwhelmingly rejected as a means of limiting 
excess demand. But this does not mean that pricing must be rejected as an instrument 
in all cases: our results show that its use in the form of compensation may be 
considered fair by the vast majority of people. 
 
The reference transaction, moral rule and queueing  
 
For KKT (1986), the feeling of unfairness appears when the exchange no longer takes 
account of the reference transaction. The concept of reference transaction allows us to 
understand the perception of justice linked to the principles of the moral rule and 
queueing. 
For both the TGV and parking scenarios, the principle by which seats and spaces are 
allocated on the basis of a moral rule is considered to be very fair (between 70% and 
90% in the case of the TGV, more than 90% in the two parking situations; see 
respectively Table 1, v3 and Table 2, v14). In both cases, the reference transaction 
involved application and compliance with this moral rule. 
In the case of queueing, our findings are slightly different. According to our results, 
queueing is not always considered to be the fairest means of allocation in the case of a 
problem of scarcity: this runs counter to the conclusions reached by FP, for whom the 
traditional “first come, first served” procedure is greatly preferred to pricing. 
While the principle of queueing is considered to be fair in the case of parking (68% in 
the exceptional situation, 69% in the recurring situation, see Table 2, v18), it is in 
contrast considered to be essentially unfair in the case of the TGV where the 
difference between the different types of situation is significant (only 37% considered 
queueing fair in the exceptional situation, and 33% in the recurring situation, see 
Table 1 and Table 3 in the Appendix, v6). 
In the case of parking, management by means of queueing seems to be well accepted 
and has therefore been incorporated into the reference transaction. In contrast, in the 
case of the TGV, the reference transaction is based on a system of seat reservation 
which means that the management of scarcity by means of queueing is negatively 
perceived.  
To sum up, the management of scarcity in the case of company parking shows that the 
reference transaction is constructed on the basis of the combined application of the 
moral rule and queueing. In the case of the TGV, the reference transaction is based on 
a moral rule and a system of reservation. 
Our results show that the reference transaction modifies the way in which a principle 
of justice which is commonly considered to be “fair”, such as queueing, is perceived.  
Do these attitudes vary according to the social and economic situation of individuals? 
We have conducted systematic (Kruskall-Wallis) tests to see whether attitudes 
towards these principles of regulation vary as a function of the personal 
socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents, namely gender, age and educational 
level(we have used the latter as an approximate guide to an individual’s income). 
Apart from in two situations, the influence of socioeconomic characteristics is 
statistically not significant.  These findings therefore do not invalidate the hypothesis that the attitudes expressed 
here by respondents are of a generic nature and independent of their personal 
situation. It is as though our respondents had placed themselves behind Rawls’ veil of 
ignorance (1971). 
 
5.  CONCLUSION  
Our results confirm the overwhelming rejection of peak period pricing as a means of 
regulating excess demand. However, the results give the impression that confronted 
by a repeated situation of excess demand, people find peak period pricing slightly 
more acceptable because it is possible to take steps beforehand in order to avoid the 
peak.  
The use of administrative procedures or lotteries to allocate seats or parking spaces is 
also rejected. Our results to some extent invalidate previous work which found that 
administrative allocation was perceived to be fairer than the pricing solution. It would 
seem that attitudes towards this principle of allocation depend on how much 
confidence people have in those managing it. 
The rejection of peak period pricing with constant supply is not intractable: people’s 
opposition can be reduced if they can influence how the monopoly uses the revenue. 
However, whether monopoly in question belongs to the public or private sectors does 
not affect the intensity of opposition to peak period pricing. 
Accompanying a price rise with an additional service or infrastructure reduces 
opposition in the same way as the right to influence the use of revenue, but the 
negative attitudes nevertheless subsist. It is the additional supply which makes pricing 
more acceptable and not the context of recurring congestion in which this solution is 
applied, rather the contrary. 
The moral rule is judged to be very fair in all cases. However, we have shown that 
managing scarcity with queues, although generally considered to be one of the 
fairesttool, is not universally considered to be so. The reference transaction may lead 
to a rejection of the management of scarcity by means of queueing, for example in the 
case of a service which is generally accessed by means of a reservation system. 
Last, our results allow us to moderate conclusions which are on first view rather 
pessimistic from the economic standpoint by showing that compensation, which is 
overwhelmingly considered to be fair, can radically modify attitudes of rejection with 
regard to the pricing instrument. The right to compensation is overwhelmingly 
demanded from the monopoly holder, whether it belongs to the public or private 
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Table 1: The case of the TGV. Median values with their confidence intervals, % fair 




or very fair 
v2  Peak period pricing with constant 
supply 
exceptional 2.0  2.0 2.0 10  % 
v4  Lottery  recurring  2.0  2.0 2.5 4  % 
v5  Unknown administrative rule  exceptional 2.0  2.0 2.5 13  % 
v4  Lottery  exceptional 2.5  2.0 2.5 17  % 
v5  Unknown administrative rule  recurring  2.5  2.5 3.0 21  % 
v2  Peak period pricing with constant 
supply 
recurring  3.0  2.5 3.0 10  % 
v6  Queueing  exceptional 3.5  3.0 3.5 37  % 
v8  Peak period pricing with additional 
supply 
recurring  3.75  3.5 4.0 29  % 
v6  Queueing  recurring  4.0  3.5 4.0 33  % 
v3  Moral rule  exceptional 5.5  5.5 5.5 90  % 
v7  Compensation   exceptional 5.5  5.5 5.5 95  % 
v3  Moral rule  recurring  6.0  6.0 6.5 70  % 
v7  Compensation   recurring  6.0  6.0 6.0 80  % 
 Table 2: The case of parking, median values with their confidence intervals, % fair 




or very fair 
v1
6 
Unknown administrative rule (MF*)  exceptional 3.0  3.0 3.5 8  % 
v1
1 
Peak period pricing with constant supply 
(MF) 
exceptional 3.5  3.0 3.5 7  % 
v1
1 
Peak period pricing with constant supply 
(MF) 
recurring 3.5 3.0  3.5  10  % 
v1
6 
Unknown administrative rule (MF)  recurring 3.5 3.0  3.5  10  % 
v1
7 
Unknown administrative rule (WC**)  exceptional 3.5  3.5 3.5 13  % 
v1
5 
Lottery  recurring 3.5 3.5  4.0  12  % 
v1
5 
Lottery  exceptional 3.5  3.5 4.0 17  % 
v1
7 
Unknown administrative rule (WC)  recurring 4.0 3.5  4.0  14  % 
v1
2 
Peak period pricing with constant supply 
(WC) 
recurring 5.0 4.5  5.5  28  % 
v1
2 
Peak period pricing with constant supply 
(WC) 
exceptional 5.5  5.0 6.0 37  % 
v2
0 
Peak period pricing with additional supply  recurring 6.0 5.0  6.5  38  % 
v2
0 
Peak period pricing with additional supply  exceptional 6.5  6.0 7.0 51  % 
v1
8 
Queueing  exceptional 7.5  7.5 8.0 68  % 
v1
8 
Queueing  recurring 8.0 7.5  8.0  69  % 
v1
9 
Compensation   exceptional 8.5  8.5 9.0 93  % 
v1
4 
Moral rule  recurring 9.0 9.0  9.0  91  % 
v1
9 
Compensation   recurring 9.0 9.0  9.0  89  % 
v1
4 
Moral rule  exceptional 9.0  9.0 9.5 96  % 
* MF = Management of the Firm, ** WC = Works Council. 
  
Table 3: for the TGV, tests of the differences between a situation of temporary and recurring 
congestion 






KS Test * 
p*** 
U Test ** 
p*** 
v4  Lottery  2.5 
2.0 
no yes  0.078 0.03 




Log yes  0.0001 <  0.0001 




Log  yes  < 0.0001  < 0.0001 
v6  Queueing  3.5 
4.0 
Log  yes  < 0.0001  < 0.0001 
v3  Moral rule  5.5 
6.0 
Log  approx.  < 0.0001  < 0.0001 
v7  Compensation   5.5 
6.0 
Log  approx.  < 0.0001  < 0.0001 
 
Table 4: case of parking, tests of the differences between the temporary and recurring situations of 
congestion. 












Peak period pricing with 
constant supply (MF) 
3.5 
3.5 
no yes  0.515  0.264 
v1
2 
Peak period pricing with 
constant supply (WC) 
5.5 
5.0 
Log approx. 0.194  0.052 
v1
4 
Moral rule  9.0 
9.0 
Log approx. 0.884  0.253 
v1
5 
Lottery  3.5 
3.5 
Log approx. 0.406  0.143 
v1
6 




Log approx. 0.523  0.038 
v1
7 




no yes  0.385  0.018 
v1
8 
Queueing  7.5 
8.0 
no yes  0.975  0.270 
v1
9 
Compensation   8.5 
9.0 
no yes  0.031  0.009 
v2
0 
Peak period pricing with 
additional supply  
6.5 
6.0 
no yes  0.031  0.005 
* Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
** Mann-Whitney test 
*** bilateral test, the value of p is compared to the significance threshold alpha/2=0.025 
  
                                                 
i Random selection on the basis of quotas (residential location, age groups, gender, economically 
active/inactive). 
 
ii The initial four possible responses (very unfair, essentially unfair, essentially fair, very fair) were 
reclassified into two categories (unfair, fair) when presenting the results. For each story, each solution 
was presented independently of the others. Moreover, the order in which the solutions were presented 
was systematically varied for each respondent in order to avoid the bias that might arise if the solutions 
were always presented in the same order. 
 
iii The full questionnaire (in French) can be obtained from the authors. The survey was conducted by 
the Lyon-based conslutancy firm Tremplin. 
 
iv This body is elected by the workforce of the firm and therefore assumed to represent its interests.  
 
v It is nevertheless noteworthy that the difference between the exceptional situation and the recurring 
situation is not significant in the case of the two types of revenue allocation (see Table 4, v11 and v12). 
 
vi Although the difference between the median values of the last two solutions is not significant, as seen 
in Table 2, the result of the Mann-Whitney test is significant and indicates that the distributions differ, 
see Table 4 (v20). 